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Virtual Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling
in the Grey Zones of International Law
Michael N. Schmitt

Abstract
This Article examines remotely conducted election meddling by cyber means in the context
of international law and asks whether such cyber operations qualify as internationally wrongful
acts. An internationally wrongful act requires both a breach of a legal obligation owed by one
State to another under international law and attribution of the act to the former. The Article
considers three possible breaches related to such meddlingviolation of the requirement to respect
sovereignty, intervention into the internal affairs of another State, and, when the cyber operations
are not attributable to the State from which they were launched, breach of the due diligence
obligation that requires States to ensure cyber operations with serious adverse consequences are
not mounted from their territory. The Article then examines the various modalities for attributing
a cyber operation to a State under international law. Whether cyber meddling in another States
election is unlawful, as well as the severity thereof, determines the range of responses available to
the victim State. The Article concludes that the law applicable to remotely conducted meddling in
another States election is unsettled, thereby comprising a normative grey zone ripe for exploitation
by States and non-State actors.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, outgoing administration
officials, including President Barack Obama and senior leaders of the intelligence
community, accused the Russian government of meddling in U.S. elections.1
European leaders raised similar concerns regarding Russian interference in
European elections.2 In contrast, President Donald Trump labeled the claims a
hoax, announced that he believed Russian President Vladimir Putins denials of
meddling, and called the intelligence agency directors political hacks.3 Now,
more than a year after his inauguration, President Trump continues to claim that
the Russians had no impact on our votes whatsoever.4
The possibility that one State might interfere in the political processes of
another is hardly shocking. Indeed, the U.S. has a long history of involving itself
covertly and overtly in foreign elections.5 But targeting a super power with an
influence campaign that exploited social media and remotely conducting active
intrusions into its cyber infrastructure marked a significant escalation in election
meddling.6 Various aspects of the Russian campaign almost certainly violated U.S.
law, as suggested by the U.S. Department of Justices February 2018 indictment
under U.S. law of numerous Russians and Russian entities with close ties to the
government.7 Far less certain is the character of the operations under international
law.
This Article addresses the legality of both the Russian influence campaign
and, since it is a growing phenomenon, cyber meddling in general. It attempts to
1

Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian
Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/3XXD-8K5C
[hereinafter Obama Press Release]; OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NATL INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D,
ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017)
[hereinafter ODNI REPORT].

2

Rick Noack, Everything We Know so Far about Russian Election Meddling in Europe, WASH. POST (Jan. 10,
2018), https://perma.cc/4XLC-G4JG.

3

Mark Landler & Michael D. Shear, Indictment Makes Trumps Hoax Claim Harder to Sell, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/a-hoax-indictments-maketrumps-claim-even-harder-to-maintain.html.
Linda Qui, How Trump Has Split with His Administration on Russian Meddling, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/us/politics/trump-russia-administration-factcheck.html.

4

5

6

7

Ishaan Tharoor, The Long History of the U.S. Interfering with Elections Elsewhere, WASH. POST (Oct. 13,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/13/the-long-historyof-the-u-s-interfering-with-elections-elsewhere.
Andy Greenberg, Everything We Know About Russias Election-Hacking Playbook, WIRED (June 9, 2017),
perma.cc/UU3W-NUGV.
Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032, 2018 WL 914777,
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
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pinpoint when cyber election meddling amounts to one or more internationally
wrongful acts, that is, when it is unlawful under international law and identifies
responses available to the target State under international law.
Such internationally wrongful acts consist of two elements.8 First, there
must be a breach of a States legal obligation through either commission or
omission. Second, the act in question must be attributable to the State concerned
pursuant to the law of State responsibility. Following the examination of these
two issues as applied to cyber operations, the Article turns to possible responses
under international law by a State that is the target of cyber election meddling.
Determining that many cyber operations lie within a grey zone of legal
uncertainty, particularly with respect to the applicable legal thresholds for
unlawfulness,9 it concludes with the authors reflections on the consequences of
this uncertainty vis-à-vis cyber election meddling.

II. T HE C ONTEXT
The most professional and thorough open-source analysis of the Russian
influence campaign is the summary of a classified report on the matter prepared
by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) under the auspices of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).10 Released less than two weeks
before President Trumps inauguration, the reports key findings, offered with a
high degree of confidence,11 were straightforward:
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016
aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russias goals were to undermine
public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and
harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and
the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect
Trump.12
8

Intl Law Commn, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, pt. 1, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 26 (2001), reprinted
in [2001] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).

9

On grey zones in international cyber law generally, see Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the
International Law of Cyberspace, 42 YALE J. INTL L. ONLINE, no. 2, 2017, at 121.

10

ODNI REPORT, supra note 1. See also the chronology of matter at 2016 Presidential Campaign
Hacking Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (Feb. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/BYR2-WFVR. On the use
of cyberspace as a tool of influence, see PIRET PERNIK, INTL CTR. FOR DEF. AND SECURITY,
HACKING FOR INFLUENCE: FOREIGN INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND CYBER-ATTACKS (2018),
https://perma.cc/VZP4-4L9G.
High confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from
multiple sources. High confidence does not imply that the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such
judgments may be wrong. ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.

11

12

Id. at ii.
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The CIA and FBI concurred, also with a high degree of confidence, that
Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trumps
election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly
contrasting her unfavorably to him.13 The NSA agreed, but only with a
moderate degree of confidence.14 Interestingly, once it appeared that Clinton
would prevail, the goal of the Russian operations shifted from supporting Trump
to undermining the coming Clinton presidency.15
According to the report, the Russian cyber influence campaign, which was
approved at the highest levels of the Russian government, was multifaceted.16
In terms of Russian legal responsibility, the most significant operations were
mounted by Russian military intelligence, the General Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate or GRU. The GRU hacked into personal email accounts of
Democratic Party officials and other political figures and exfiltrated a great deal
of data from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in March 2016.17 It then
utilized the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and WikiLeaks to distribute the
material, including through various exclusive releases to the media.18 Additionally,
the Russian efforts included hacking into state and local boards of election to
acquire a capability to exploit them, although apparently no votes were affected.19
During this period, an active Russian propaganda campaign involving
numerous media outlets, including RT and Sputnik, was also underway.20 More
legally significant than this classic form of political propaganda were the social
media activities of quasi-government trolls who amplified stories of scandals
about Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.21
The troll farm, known as the Internet Research Agency, was financed by a
close Putin ally with ties to Russian intelligence.22 Although the organizations
13

Id.

14

Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but
not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Id. at
13.
Id. at ii.

15
16
17
18

19

20
21
22

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 23. On tying Guccifer 2.0 to the Russian government, see Kevin Poulsen and Spencer
Ackerman, Lone DNC Hacker Guccifer 2.0 Slipped up and Revealed He Was a Russian Intelligence Officer,
DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/V6W9-TG6N.
ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 3; Joseph Tanfani, Russians Targeted Election Systems in 21 States, but
Didnt Change Any Results, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2017), http://perma.cc/R7WJ-H3N7.
ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
Id. at 4.
Id. That ally was Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian oligarch who both financed and controlled the
Internet Research Agency. Neil MacFarquhar, Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by U.S., Is
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mission was to support the Russian domestic and international political agenda,
the extent of control the government exercised over the Internet Research Agency
remains unclear; a fact that, as will be explained, hinders legal attribution of its
operations to the State.23
Consisting of over ninety trolls, the Internet Research Agency spent in
excess of two million dollars to purchase anti-Clinton and pro-Trump advertising
on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.24 Using more
than 120 groups and social media accounts, the objective was not only to convince
individuals how to vote, but also to keep certain voters from the polls. For
example, some messaging claimed that Hillary Clinton doesnt deserve the black
vote!25 Trolls also leveraged social media to encourage nearly forty anti-Clinton
protests and pro-Trump rallies in swing states.26
The following year, ODNI released its annual Worldwide Threat Assessment,
which warned that [f]oreign elections are critical inflection points that offer
opportunities for Russia to advance its interests both overtly and covertly, and
that [t]he 2018 US mid-term elections are a potential target for Russian influence
operations.27 Three days later, the grand jury in Special Counsel Robert Muellers
Known
as
Putins
Cook,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/world/europe/prigozhin-russia-indictmentmueller.html. Trolls are individuals who post offensive, inflammatory, derogatory, false, or
controversial comments online, often in the hope of inciting a reaction. The name of the activity,
trolling, is derived from the fishing term that referring to drawing a baited line through the water.
On trolls, see Zoe Williams, What is an Internet Troll?, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2012),
https://perma.cc/7G2M-B7JC.
23

24

25

Adrian
Chen,
The
Agency,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(June
2,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html; Adrian Chen, What Muellers
Indictment Reveals about Russias Internet Research Agency, NEW YORKER (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://perma.cc/DCF4-LY7L; Krishnadev Calamur, What is the Internet Research Agency?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/WW4E-DJ9W.
Oliver Carroll, St. Petersburg Troll Farm Had 90 Dedicated Staff Working to Influence US Election
Campaign, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/BL34-WK9F.
Dave Lee, The Tactics of a Russian Troll Farm, BBC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/T3L5-KA4J.

26

See id. As an example of encouraging rallies, one troll using a false U.S. persona Facebook account
sent a message to the Florida for Trump account stating:
Hi there! Im a member of Being Patriotic online community. Listen, weve got
an idea. Florida is still a purple state and we need to paint it red. If we lose
Florida, we lose America. We cant let it happen, right? What about organizing
a YUGE pro-Trump flash mob in every Florida town? We are currently reaching
out to local activists and weve got the folks who are okay to be in charge of
organizing their events almost everywhere in FL. However, we still need your
support. What do you think about that? Are you in?
Indictment, supra note 7, at 26.

27

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 115th Cong. 11 (2018) (Statement of Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Natl Intelligence),
https://perma.cc/2J27-8AE5. At a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February
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investigation indicted thirteen individuals and three companies associated with the
trolling operations.28
Those indicted worked for the Internet Research Agency and were accused
of conspiring with each other and with persons known and unknown to defraud
the U.S. by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the
government through fraud and deceit for the purpose of interfering with the U.S.
political and electoral processes, including the presidential election of 2016.29 In
line with the 2017 intelligence communitys assessment, the indictment alleged
that by early to mid-2016, Defendants operations included supporting the
presidential campaign of the candidate Donald J. Trump [ ] and disparaging
Hillary Clinton.30 They also involved the use of social media to criticize
Republican candidates Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, as well as to support the
Bernie Sanders campaign.31
Of particular importance with regard to international law and the issue of
legal attribution that is discussed below is the allegation that the defendants posed
as Americans, created false American personas, and stole the identities of real
Americans in the effort to leverage social media.32 At times, some of the
defendants even traveled to the U.S. and used U.S.-based cyber infrastructure to
mask the Russian origin of their activities.
The week after the indictments were issued, President Trump took to
Twitter to claim that [t]he results of the 2016 election were not impacted or
changed and to allege [c]ollusion between Russia and Crooked H, the DNC and
the Dems.33 He also chastised then-National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster for
failing to make the same claim during his address to the Munich Security
Conference.34
The U.S. is not alone in falling victim to election cyber meddling. A sampling
of such cyber operations signals their growing appeal to States wishing to
manipulate foreign elections. Most well-known are the 2014 CyberBerkut (a group
13, the leaders of the intelligence community made the same assertions. All of them also reaffirmed
the conclusions contained in the 2017 ODNI REPORT, supra note 1. See Miles Parks, Russian Threat
to Elections to Persist through 2018, Spy Bosses Warn Congress, NATL PUB. RADIO (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/W7U9-3KSE.
28
29
30
31

Indictment, supra note 7.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 17.

32

See also Scott Shane, The Fake Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html.

33

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
https://perma.cc/M4HG-UJR6.

34

Id.

36

TWITTER

(Feb.

17,

2018,

8:22

PM),
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of Russian hacktivists) operations targeting the Ukrainian Central Election
Commission. Elements of the Commissions network were down for nearly
twenty hours and on election day a false winner was announced.35 Two years
later, the GRU, specifically its APT-28 or Fancy Bear hacking unit,
targeted the German Bundestag, Germanys Foreign and Finance Ministries, and
the Christian Democratic Unions (the party of Chancellor Angela Merkel)
systems.36 Likewise, in 2017, Emmanuel Macrons campaign for the French
Presidency was the object of cyber operations that some experts attribute to
the GRU.37 The operations involved phishing attacks meant to implant
malware on the campaigns website. Reportedly, the operations digital
fingerprints resembled those of the operations against the U.S. Democratic
National Committee and Angela Merkels campaign the previous year.38
In November 2017, such activities led U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May
just a week after Trump stated that he believed Putins denial of meddlingto
announce, We know what you are doing and you will not succeed because you
underestimate the resilience of our democracies, the enduring attraction of free
and open societies and the commitment of Western nations to the alliances that
bind us.39 At the same time, the U.K. Electoral Commission opened an
investigation into whether the Brexit vote had been targeted.40
Even Russia purportedly was victimized by cyber meddling during its
presidential election. In 2018, RT News reported a distributed denial of service
attack on the Russian Central Election Commission that originated from locations
in fifteen countries.41 The Commission Chairperson stated that the attack had no
effect, as its automated election system is not connected to the global network. 42

35

36

37

38

39

40

Nikolay Koval, Revolution Hacking, in CYBER WAR IN PERSPECTIVE: RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST
UKRAINE 55, 5658 (Kenneth Geers ed., 2015); See also Mark Clayton, Ukraine Election Narrowly
Avoided Wanton Destruction from Hackers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 17, 2014),
https://perma.cc/N9UE-TVE6.
Sumi Somaskanda, The Cyber Threat to Germanys Elections Is Very Real, ATLANTIC (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/5KA4-MJCR.
Eric Auchard, Macron Campaign Was Target of Cyber Attacks by Spy-Linked Group, REUTERS (Apr. 24,
2017), https://perma.cc/6FJH-L9LL.
Id.; see also Laura Daniels, How Russia Hacked the French Election, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://perma.cc/F3X6-DZVG.
Theresa May Accuses Vladimir Putin of Election Meddling, BBC (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://perma.cc/HJ5P-5NAF.
Id.

41

Russian Central Election Commission Comes under Cyberattack, RT NEWS (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://perma.cc/D634-SBWL.

42

Id.
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The U.S. does not come to the table with clean hands, having aggressively
engaged in covert operations to influence elections from the 1950s through the
1980s, including such notable examples as Guatemala, Iran, Chile, and Nicaragua.
More recently, the U.S. offered economic aid to Russia in an attempt to bolster
support for Boris Yeltsin during his 1996 reelection campaign.43 The U.S.
employed the same technique in support of Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian
elections, and during the 2005 Iraqi elections Congress blocked a plan to covertly
fund certain candidates.44
Four years later, the U.S. unsuccessfully tried to prevent the reelection of
Afghan President Hamid Karzai.45 An Afghan Supreme Court justice, who was
one of the two Afghans on the five member Electoral Complaints Commission,
resigned his post in protest over foreign interference.46 Indeed, there is a longstanding U.S. practice of supporting both opposition and civic groups active in
mobilizing voters, as in the 2000 reelection campaign of Slobodan Milosevic and
on a recurring basis in Belarus in an effort to weaken President Alexander
Lukashenko.47 As Loch Johnson, has observed:
Weve been doing this kind of thing since the C.I.A. was created in
1947. . . . Weve used posters, pamphlets, mailers, bannersyou name it.
Weve planted false information in foreign newspapers. Weve used what the
British call King Georges cavalry: suitcases of cash.48

And, as in Russia, the effort extends beyond de jure organs of government. In 2016,
for instance, the National Endowment for Democracy, a private non-profit
organization based in Washington, D.C., awarded nearly $7,000,000 to Russian
activists and civic organizations.49
Still, some scholars maintain that there is a notable difference between the
American and Russian approaches to electoral interference. For example, Thomas
Carothers argues that post-Cold War U.S. influence activities are distinguishable
from Russias interference in Western elections, stating:
43

See generally Thomas Carothers, Is the U.S. Hypocritical to Criticize Russian Election Meddling?, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/WU6L-4XJ5.

44

Id.; see also Scott Shane, Russia Isnt the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It, Too, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-review/russia-isnt-the-only-onemeddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html.
Sabrina Tavernise et al., With New Afghan Vote, Path to Stability Is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21afghan.html.
Afghan Quits Election Complaints Commission, CNN (Oct. 13, 2009), https://perma.cc/3AUV-J7V3.

45

46
47
48
49

Carothers, supra note 43.
Shane, Russia Isnt the Only One, supra note 44.
Russia 2016, NATL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/N4RWPFEN. The endowment no longer reports its recipients in light of new laws making the receipt of
foreign funding unlawful.
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[U]nlike Russian electoral meddling, U.S. democracy promotion does not
seek to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, systematically spread lies, favor
particular candidates, or undercut the technical integrity of elections. On the
whole, it seeks to help citizens exercise their basic political and civil rights in
electoral processes, enhance the technical integrity of such processes, and
increase electoral transparency.50

Regardless of whether this argument is convincing, the question remains as
to whether attempts to influence elections, especially in light of current and
emerging cyber technologies, comport with international law in general.

III. B REACH OF L EGAL O BLIGATION
The Obama Administration, despite publicly pointing the finger at Russia
for engaging in election meddling, never asserted that the actions violated any
primary rule of international law.51 Instead, when imposing sanctions, President
Obama merely cited Russias efforts to undermine established international
norms of behavior, and interfere with democratic governance.52 Similarly, the
report issued by his intelligence agencies failed to allege that the Russian efforts
were unlawful under international law. Unsurprisingly, given President Trumps
skepticism about the Russian operations, the current administration has remained
silent as to whether Russian actions violated internationally binding norms.
This reticence begs the question of the legal character of cyber election
meddling. A number of possibilities, examined below, dominate discussion. The
two most prominent are violation of the target States sovereignty and
intervention into the internal affairs of the State holding the elections. A third
possibility that is often ignored is breach of the obligation to exercise due diligence
that the States territory is not used as the location from which non-State actors
or other States launch the cyber meddling operations.

A. Violation of Sovereignty
In the case of election meddling, the likeliest breach by a State of its
international law obligations is violation of the target States sovereignty. Before
turning to the merits of that possibility, it is first necessary to address a recent
dispute over whether sovereignty is a primary rule of international law or merely
a foundational principle from which primary rules such as the prohibitions on
50

Carothers, supra note 43.

51

Primary rules of international law impose obligations on States, whereas secondary rules set forth
the general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible for
wrongful actions or omissions, and the legal consequences which flow therefrom. Intl Law
Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8.

52

Obama Press Release, supra note 1.
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intervention and the use of force emanate.53 This is a key point because if
sovereignty is not a primary rule of international law, then election meddling
cannot qualify as an internationally wrongful act in that context.
Until very recently, and as illustrated below, there appeared to be broad
consensus that sovereignty is both a principle and a primary rule of international
law. As a principle, the concept denotes international laws acknowledgment that
States are primarily responsible for what happens on their territory and that other
States should respect said competence. On this basis, sovereignty is the fount from
which various primary rules, like the prohibition on intervention into the internal
affairs of other States, emerged. At the same time, sovereignty was also
understood to be a primary rule of international law that is itself susceptible to
violation. For instance, States have often accused other States of violating their
sovereignty. The classic examples are non-consensual penetration of national
airspace or territorial waters by government aircraft or vessels, respectively. In
fact, at times, a single act might breach both the obligation to respect another
States sovereignty and a different primary rule derived from the principle of
sovereignty, as when a State violates another States sovereignty by unlawfully
employing force within the latters territory.
This approach had apparently been embraced by the U.N. Group of
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications, a body consisting of State representatives tasked to assess
norms in cyberspace. In its 2015 consensus report, it concluded: State
sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from sovereignty
apply to the conduct by States of ICT-related activities and to their jurisdiction
over ICT infrastructure within their territory.54
Sovereignty as both a principle and rule position was unanimously adopted
by the International Group of Experts (IGE) that prepared the Tallinn Manual 2.0

53

On intervention, see Section III.B, infra, and accompanying notes. The prohibition on the use of
force is set forth in U.N. Charter article 2(4) and reflects customary international law. The Tallinn
Manual 2.0 experts concurred that cyber operations are capable of violating the prohibition, even
when not accompanied by kinetic operations. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 168 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. However, because of the relatively high consequential threshold for
violation, it is unlikely, although not inconceivable, that cyber election meddling would qualify as
an unlawful use of force. On the subject of cyber uses of force, see Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of
Cyber Force and International Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1110 (Marc Weller ed. 2015).

54

Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in the
Context of Intl Security, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. GGE 2015
Report]. See also Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. in the Field of Info. and
Telecomm. in the Context of Intl Security, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013) [hereinafter
U.N. GGE 2013 Report].
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on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, the product of a seven-year
project to determine how international law applies in the cyber context.55 The IGE
consisted of two groups of twenty international experts, and its conclusions were
vetted by scores of peer reviewers. Nor did the premise of sovereignty as a primary
rule encounter serious pushback from States during the Hague Process, which
brought together fifty delegations, along with representatives from a number of
international organizations, to consider drafts of the manual prior to publication.
Finally, adherence to the premise that sovereignty may be violated appeared
to be the established U.S. position, as indicated in remarks by Department of State
Legal Adviser Harold Koh at a 2012 interagency legal conference held at U.S.
Cyber Command:
States conducting activities in cyberspace must take into account the
sovereignty of other States, including outside the context of armed conflict.
The physical infrastructure that supports the internet and cyber activities is
generally located in sovereign territory and subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial State.56

The position of most other countries is in accord. For instance, at the
European launch of Tallinn Manual 2.0, Dutch Foreign Minister Bert Koenders
noted that we mustnt be naive. Cyber operations against institutions, political
parties, and individuals underline why we need the international legal principles of
sovereignty and nonintervention in the affairs of other states.57
Indications began to surface in 2016 that certain U.S. officials tasked with
rendering legal advice concerning cyber operations had adopted a different view.
This view was set forth most fully in an American Journal of International Law Unbound
article by Colonel Gary Corn, the Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Cyber Command,
and Robert Taylor, a recently retired senior attorney from the Department of
Defenses Office of General Counsel. According to Corn and Taylor:
Some argue that limitations imposed by the concept of sovereignty fill this
normative spacethat sovereignty is itself a binding rule of international law
that precludes virtually any action by one state in the territory of another that
violates the domestic law of that other state, absent consent. However, law
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and state practice instead indicate that sovereignty serves as a principle of
international law that guides state interactions, but is not itself a binding rule
that dictates results under international law. While this principle of
sovereignty, including territorial sovereignty, should factor into the conduct
of every cyber operation, it does not establish an absolute bar against
individual or collective state cyber operations that affect cyberinfrastructure
within another state, provided that the effects do not rise to the level of an
unlawful use of force or an unlawful intervention.58

Corn and Taylors assertions are both counter-factual and counternormative. First, those taking the opposing view do not argue that any nonconsensual cyber operation contravening the target States domestic law also
amounts to a violation of sovereignty. For instance, they are of the view that
remote cyber activities that violate domestic law on espionage would not, in
themselves, violate international law.59 Indeed, violation of a States domestic legal
regime seldom bears on the breach of a primary rule of international law. Nor do
those viewing sovereignty as a primary rule of law suggest that sovereignty
constitutes an absolute bar to cyber operations conducted by other States. Instead,
as will be explained, proponents assert that the nature of the cyber activity and its
attendant consequences determine whether a violation of sovereignty has
occurred. Despite such inaccuracies, it is essential to understand that by adopting
the Corn-Taylor approach, election meddling by cyber-means would never
amount to a violation of the target States sovereignty, for only the breach of an
obligation contained in a primary rule of international law qualifies as an
internationally wrongful act.
The opposing approach was set forth in a Texas Law Review article in which
the author and a colleague surveyed treatment of the matter by international
tribunals, States, international organizations, and academics.60 We concluded that
sovereignty has been treated for decades as a primary rule of international law,
and we could identify no basis for treating the concept differently in the context
of cyberspace.61 For us, and for the majority of States and international law
experts, the question that presents itself is whether a remote cyber operation such
as election meddling rises to the level of a violation of sovereignty.62 As Brian
Eagan, then the Department of States Legal Adviser, noted during a 2017
Berkeley Law School address:
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The very design of the Internet may lead to some encroachment on other
sovereign jurisdictions. Precisely when a nonconsensual cyber operation
violates the sovereignty of another State is a question lawyers within the U.S.
government continue to study carefully, and it is one that ultimately will be
resolved through the practice and opinio juris of States.63

The 1928 Island of Palmas arbitration sets forth the classic definition of
sovereignty: [s]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein,
to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.64 This definition
signals the two critical aspects of sovereignty: territoriality and State functions. It
also confirms that only States violate sovereignty, either directly, such as by virtue
of cyber operations conducted by its organs, or by attribution of a non-State
actors cyber operation pursuant to the law of State responsibility, an issue
examined in further detail below.
As noted, it is well-accepted that a States non-consensual, physical
penetration of another States territory, or even unconsented to and adverse
presence thereon, amounts to a violation of sovereignty. The question is when
should a remotely conducted cyber operation by, or attributable to, one State that
manifests on cyber infrastructure in anothers territory be treated as analogously
running afoul of the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts struggled mightily with this issue. They built
rough consensus around two situations. First, the experts agreed, based on the
right of a State to control access to its territory, that a violation of sovereignty may
result from an infringement on a States territorial integrity. In this regard, they
generally agreed that a remotely conducted cyber operation causing physical
damage either to the targeted cyber infrastructure (as was the case with the Stuxnet
operation) or objects reliant thereon, or injury to persons, violates sovereignty.65
It makes no difference whether the damaged cyber infrastructure is private or
governmental, for the crux of the violation is the causation of consequences upon
the States territory.
It is unlikely that a State would engage in election meddling by causing
physical damage to cyber infrastructure, if only because lesser means would usually
suffice to achieve its objective. The more likely scenario is a cyber operation
designed to induce a loss of functionality of either election systems or cyber
infrastructure with a nexus to the election, such as the servers of a political party.
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts extended the notion of damage to loss of
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Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept of State, Remarks at Berkeley Law School on International
Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/B6TH-232L.
Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).

65

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 20.

Summer 2018

43

Chicago Journal of International Law

functionality on the basis that it should not matter whether targeted systems are
physically damaged or simply rendered inoperative, for the effect is usually the
same the system no longer works.66 As an example, the 2012 cyber operations
against Saudi Aramco necessitated the replacement of affected computers and
therefore, if conducted by another State as is suspected, amounted to a violation
of sovereignty even though the systems suffered no physical damage.67 Treating
the loss of functionality as the equivalent of physical damage comports with the
object and purpose of the rule of sovereignty: to afford the territorial State control
over consequential activities on its territory.
By this teleological approach, a malicious cyber operation that causes any
election-related cyber infrastructure on a States territory to cease to operate would
qualify as a sovereignty violation. As an example, a foreign States operation that
disabled the computer systems of a political action committee or media
organization that favored one candidate would breach sovereignty. The critical
point is not that there was a nexus between the targeted system and the election,
but instead simply that the operation resulted in the requisite harma loss of
functionality.
It must be cautioned that the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts could not achieve
consensus as to the precise meaning of loss of functionality. For some, the
notion implies an irreversible loss of function. For others, it extends to situations
in which physical repair, as in replacement of a hard drive, is necessary. A number
of Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts would treat the need to replace the operating system
or bespoke data upon which the functioning of the system relies as a loss of
functionality.68 The author sympathizes with the latter position because the
essence of sovereignty is control by the State over activities on its territory; remote
cyber operations that necessitate reloading or replacement represent a significant
intrusion on that legal prerogative.
The most legally unsettled situations with respect to sovereignty, however,
are those cyber operations that manifest on another States territory without
causing physical damage or serious loss of functionality. It was difficult to identify
majority and minority views amongst the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts on the subject.
Even those experts willing to consider the possibility that a violation of
sovereignty is possible in such scenarios took contrasting positions. Among the
activities proffered by one or more of them as sovereignty violations were:
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a cyber operation causing cyber infrastructure or programs to operate
differently; altering or deleting data stored in cyber infrastructure without
causing physical or functional consequences, as described above; emplacing
malware into a system; installing backdoors; and causing a temporary, but
significant, loss of functionality, as in the case of a major DDoS operation.69

In the authors view, an operation rendering cyber infrastructure incapable
of performing its functions in the manner intended qualifies as a sovereignty
violation. One that causes election machinery to misreport results, for example,
would fall into this category, as would one that renders machinery incapable of
transmitting valid elections results.
Interestingly, and despite disagreement over these diverse examples, each
expert tended to justify his or her position by reference to the object and purpose
of the principle of sovereignty that affords States the full control over access to
and activities on their territory.70 In light of this confusing mélange of views, it is
impossible to draw definitive red lines regarding cyber election meddling in the
context of the territorial aspect of sovereignty, except with respect to situations
causing physical damage or at least a significant impact on functionality. Since
most operations are unlikely to reach this threshold, a grey zone of normative
uncertainty looms when assessing such interference in a foreign States elections.
It accordingly would be difficult to make the case that the Russian cyber
operations constituted a violation of U.S. sovereignty solely on the basis that they
manifested on U.S. territory.
A more fertile ground for finding a violation of sovereignty vis-à-vis remote
cyber operations affecting another States elections is interference with, or
usurpation of, inherently governmental functions.71 Such activities, which need
not cause damage or loss of functionality, violate sovereignty because States enjoy
the exclusive right to perform inherently governmental activities on their territory.
The inherently governmental function concept lacks granularity, although some
cases are clear. On the one hand, purely commercial activities, even if engaged in
by State-owned enterprises, do not qualify, for they obviously are not within the
exclusive purview of a State. On the other hand, law enforcement and defense of
the State from external attack are inherently governmental in character.
Between these extremes lies a great deal of uncertainty. Fortunately, for our
purposes, a paradigmatic example of an inherently governmental function is the
holding of elections. This being so, the issue is whether cyber activities qualify as
interference or usurpation by virtue of their effect on an election. Interference
denotes activities that disturb the territorial States ability to perform the functions
as it wishes. By contrast, usurpation involves performing an inherently
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governmental function on another States territory without its consent. In both
examples, an external actor is disrupting the ability of the target State to perform
its governmental functions.
While the usurpation criterion has little relevance in the election meddling
context, cyber operations may well be employed to interfere with another States
elections. Certain operations would plainly qualify, as in the case of a cyber
operation that altered election data or a temporary distributed denial of service
attack against election machinery that rendered it impossible for voters in a
particular district to cast their votes. In States with online voting, the implantation
of malware in private computers that blocks voting likewise would constitute
interference, as would using cyber operations to alter voter registration numbers.
It is equally clear that merely engaging in election propaganda does not
amount to interference, at least as a matter of law. This conclusion is supported
by the extensive State practice of engaging in both truthful and untruthful
propaganda during foreign elections. Of course, such activities may be
condemned, as the efforts of RT and Sputnik and the purchase of advertising on
social media were in the ODNI Report,72 but such condemnation is seldom based
on assertions of a breach of international law, specifically the obligation to respect
sovereignty. This paucity of opinio juris and surfeit of contrary practice
corroborates the conclusion that election propaganda by cyber-means does not
violate a target States sovereignty.73
Other Russian activities likewise failed to reach the level of interference.
Although the financial sums spent by Russia and its supporters in attempting to
influence the U.S. elections were large, international law imposes no monetary
threshold at which the financing of election activities in another State constitutes
interference, even though as a practical matter foreign financing can determine
the outcome of an election. The penetration by Russian hackers of local boards
of election similarly failed to qualify as interference, for there was no subsequent
activity that exploited the access to affect the elections. As such, interference did
not occur. Moreover, even though Russian operations encouraged protests and
rallies, these acts do not qualify as interference because, so long as they are
peaceful, they are a regular feature in many democratic elections.
Russian operators succeeded by avoiding both ends of this legal spectrum
and instead operated adroitly in the legal grey zone lying between them. Consider
the messaging conducted by Russian trolls. The difference between their activities
and those of a State or State-supportive media outlet that conducts an open
propaganda campaign, even one involving disinformation, is the ability of the
electorate to consider the source of the information. Indeed, recall that in order
to enhance their efforts, the trolls created fake identities in which they
72
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masqueraded as Americans, sometimes even impersonating actual Americans.
Thus, in addition to conveying a message to the electorate, the trolls sought to
bolster that message by feigning the source thereof. Arguably, this manipulation
of voters ability to assess the messages in coming to their own decision tipped
the scales and therefore constituted unlawful interference.
Another Russian activity within this grey zone was the hacking into various
servers containing, inter alia, email traffic. As noted, the mere fact that the systems
were penetrated does not suffice to qualify the hacking as interference with the
election any more than espionage involving government systems is unlawful. In
certain cases, however, the operations involved exfiltration of data and its
weaponization through release at critical points in the election.74 An assertion
that the exfiltration and subsequent release were materially more aggravated than
mere propaganda or disinformation, such that the operations qualified as
interference, is at least somewhat supportable.
Note, in this regard, that whether the operations successfully swayed the
election has no bearing on their lawfulness, as the essence of a sovereignty
violation is the fact of interference. That said, there must be a degree of
interference even if it does not achieve its desired objective. For example, a cyber
operation that attempts to alter election returns, but which is foiled by effective
point defenses in the targeted system, lacks the element of interference.75
Taken together, the most legally sustainable and persuasive position is that
aspects of the Russian influence campaign violated U.S. sovereignty.76 Yet, this
conclusion is far from unassailable. As noted above, an argument, albeit not widely
held, holds that sovereignty may never be violated because it is not a primary rule
of international law. Moreover, even if sovereignty serves as a primary rule, there
was no damage or substantial loss of functionality to any cyber infrastructure
related to the U.S. election. Likewise, the Russian operations cleverly avoided
actions, such as creating flawed returns, that would unmistakably amount to
interference by taking on an inherently governmental function. Although the
influence campaign was condemnable, it must be acknowledged that Russia
conducted its operations in the grey zone of the law of sovereignty, thereby
74
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complicating potential U.S. responses and avoiding the international communitys
opprobrium for violating international law.

B. Intervention
The other breach of an international law obligation most likely to be
committed through election meddling is unlawful intervention into the internal
affairs of another State.77 Sovereignty is the foundational principle from which this
primary rule of customary law derives.78 As noted by Lassa Oppenheim, the
obligation not to intervene is the corollary of every States right to sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence.79 Accordingly, States must respect
the right of other States to exercise control over certain activities occurring on
their territory. Note that like the violation of sovereignty, only States can engage
in unlawful intervention, either directly through the actions of their organs or
indirectly through instructions to, or control over, non-State actors such as IT
companies, hacker groups, or terrorist organizations. And, as with sovereignty
violations, cyber operations targeting both private and government infrastructure
can qualify as intervention.80
Two elements must be satisfied before a cyber operation qualifies as
wrongful intervention. The operation must affect a States domaine réservé and it
must be coercive.81 Absent one of these elements, the operation may constitute
interference, but it will not rise to the level of unlawful intervention.
With respect to the first element, the difference between an inherently
governmental function in the context of sovereignty and the domaine réservé is
77
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subtle; the two categories often overlap. The former denotes an activity reserved
for the government alone, while the latter refers to one that has not been
committed to international law by either treaty or customary law. In its Nicaragua
judgment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) explained that a prohibited
intervention must . . . be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted
by the principle of sovereignty, to decide freely.82 The Court went on to highlight
the choice of a political . . . system as a clear-cut example of a domaine réservé.83
The conduct of elections is both an inherently governmental act and within
the States domaine réservé. Some limited carve-outs of this domaine réservé exist,
principally with respect to human rights norms such as self-determination, a topic
briefly mentioned below. But, as a general matter, the process by which a State
selects its officials is left to the determination of that State and is broadly
unregulated by international law. Accordingly, cyber activities by foreign States
that affect either the process by which elections are conducted or their outcome
qualify as prohibited intervention, so long as the second prong of the intervention
test, coercion, is satisfied.84
In the election context, the determinative factor distinguishing external
influence on an election (which may be unlawful in the context of a sovereignty
violation involving an inherently governmental function) from prohibited
intervention is the element of coercion. Referring to the right of a State to choose
its own political system, the ICJ observed in Nicaragua, Intervention is wrongful
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain
free ones.85 According to the Court, the element of coercion . . . defines, and
indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention.86
The question is therefore what type of election meddling can be said to be
coercive. Although international law provides no conclusive definition of the
82
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term, the Declaration on Friendly Relations provides that [n]o State may use or
encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures to coerce
another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its
sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.87 Drawing on this
text, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts agreed that coercion refers to an affirmative
act designed to deprive another State of its freedom of choice, that is, to force
that State to act in an involuntary manner or involuntarily refrain from acting in a
particular way.88
Some election meddling certainly would reach this threshold. As Brian Egan
noted while serving as Department of State Legal Adviser, a cyber operation by
a State that interferes with another countrys ability to hold an election or that
manipulates another countrys election results would be a clear violation of the
rule of non-intervention.89 Blocking voting by cyber means, such as by disabling
election machinery or by conducting a distributed denial of service attack, would
likewise be coercive. In both of these situations, the result of the election, which
is the expression of the freedom of choice of the electorate, is being manipulated
against the will of the electorate.
At the other end of the spectrum are cyber operations designed to influence
decisions in the target State without reaching the threshold of coercion. As
explained in the Tallinn Manual 2.0:
[C]oercion must be distinguished from persuasion, criticism, public
diplomacy, propaganda, retribution, mere maliciousness, and the like in the
sense that, unlike coercion, such activities merely involve either influencing
(as distinct from factually compelling) the voluntary actions of the target State
or seek no action on the part of the target State at all.90

Therefore, those actions described as lawful in the context of sovereignty
violations, like espionage, slanted media reporting by Russian controlled media,
and the purchase of advertising to sway the electorate in favor of a particular
candidate, are similarly not coercive and do not qualify as a prohibited
intervention.
As with sovereignty violations, a significant grey zone of normative
uncertainty exists between the two ends of the influence-intervention continuum.
Again, the Russian cyber meddling exploited this grey zone, thereby frustrating
the ability of U.S. officials to characterize it as unlawful and thereby have the
grounds for fashioning a robust response. The two best prospects for qualifying

87

G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 77, at ¶ 3.

88
89

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 317.
Egan, supra note 63.

90

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 31819.

50

Vol. 19 No. 1

Virtual Disenfranchisement

Schmitt

Russian operations as intervention were the cyber activities that feigned American
citizenship and the hacking and subsequent release of private data.
At its core, a coercive action is intended to cause the State to do something,
such as take a decision that it would otherwise not take, or not to engage in an
activity in which it would otherwise engage. Thus, coercion can be said to
subordinate the sovereign will of the target State.91 In the case of elections, this
might manifest in the election of a candidate who otherwise would not win, the
weakening of a successful candidates political base, or the strengthening of an
unsuccessful candidates base in anticipation of future elections.
Arguably, the covert nature of the troll operation deprived the American
electorate of its freedom of choice by creating a situation in which it could not
fairly evaluate the information it was being provided. As the voters were unaware
that they were being manipulated by a foreign power, their decision making, and
thus their ability to control their governance, was weakened and distorted. The
deceptive nature of the trolling is what distinguishes it from a mere influence
operation. And it can be argued that the hacking and release tainted the electoral
process by introducing information that, albeit genuine, was acquired by means
that are expressly prohibited under U.S. domestic law, as well as the law of most
other Statesnamely, the unlawful penetration and exfiltration of private data. 92
In this sense, the electorates freedom of choice was being thwarted.
These conclusions are by no means unassailable. In particular, it remains
unresolved whether coercion requires a direct causal nexus between the act in
question and the coercive effect, as in the case of changing election results.93 A
number of Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts took this position.94 However, a majority of
them, including the author, was of the view that indirect causation of coercive
effect suffices.95 This is an essential distinction because both of the
aforementioned Russian activities were indirect in the sense that, while they may
have affected the voters choice of candidates, or even their decision to vote at all,
the operations did not in themselves alter the result. Because indirect causation
moves the activity along the continuum in the direction of interference and away
from intervention, to survive as intervention it is critical to highlight the centrality
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of the covert nature of the Russian operations and the extent to which they
distorted the accepted U.S. electoral dynamic.
If indirect causation satisfies the causal facet of coercion, the fact that
intervention need not be directed against governmental election infrastructure is
of particular importance, for it means that cyber operations directed against a
political party could qualify. An example would be a denial of service attack against
the partys website, blog, email or other forms of online campaigning at a critical
juncture in the election.96 A cyber operation that generated false messages
purportedly from the party and attempted to sway votes or alter the partys actual
messaging in a significant way also would qualify.
President Trump has repeatedly suggested that any election meddling that
might have occurred did not affect the outcome. However, whether this is true as
a matter of fact is irrelevant as a matter of law. The internationally wrongful act
of prohibited intervention does not require that the cyber operations in question
be successful. It only requires that they be intended to have a coercive effect with
respect to a domaine réservé, in this case elections.
As should be apparent, the prohibition of intervention in the context of
election meddling, like the violation of sovereignty, is characterized by substantial
uncertainty.97 Fortunately, there is no disagreement over whether the prohibition
comprises a primary rule of international law. But, while there are clear-cut cases
that either do or do not breach the meddling States obligations vis-à-vis
96

For an innovative, albeit somewhat overbroad, call for application of the principle of nonintervention to DDoS attacks, see William Mattessich, Note, Digital Destruction: Applying the Principle
of Non-Intervention to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Manifesting No Physical Damage, 54 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 873 (2016).

97

This uncertainty was acknowledged during a 2017 workshop of the European Leadership Network
tasked with assessing key concepts and norms in Russia-West relations:
A destabilising factor affecting relations between Russia and the West have been
the accusations over suspected interference in elections, both the US elections
last year and the Russian elections in 2011. While the text of the nonintervention principle makes no explicit reference to elections, its remit covers
direct and indirect activities that breach national and political independence,
challenge political stability or change political systems.
Events of the past year and a half highlight the incomplete nature of these
prohibitions. The conduct of political campaigns, their direct and indirect
support by foreign nationals, external governments, and the funding of parties
and lobby groups by foreign states highlight the weakness of the Helsinki sixth
principle. In addition, the marketisation of politics including through sponsored
political advertisements and private fundraising enterprises has circumvented
the non-intervention restrictions. The outcome of an electoral process directly
affects a states political independence and stability, yet the modern-day conduct
of elections is not adequately safeguarded against the involvement of foreign
actors, and the international normative framework remains incomplete.
DENITSA RAYNOVA, TOWARDS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE NON-INTERVENTION
PRINCIPLE: EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK POST-WORKSHOP REPORT 1, 6 (Oct. 2017).
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intervention, a significant grey zone lies between the easy cases, particularly with
respect to indirect coercion.98 This grey zone creates legal uncertainly and affords
States fertile ground in which to meddle in each others political activities.

C. Due Diligence
In some cases, a lack of sufficient evidence will preclude officials from
concluding that another State conducted cyber election meddling, or that the
operations were otherwise attributable to it, as discussed below. However, if it can
be established that they were mounted from the territory of a particular State, the
possibility that the territorial State may be in breach of its due diligence obligation
arises.99
The principle of due diligence obligates States to ensure that their territory
is not used as a location from which cyber operations having serious adverse
consequences for the target State are launched.100 The ICJ acknowledged the
principle of due diligence and the legal obligation it creates in its first case, Corfu
Channel.101 In the judgment, the court observed that it is every States obligation
not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of
other states.102 Judge John Basset Moore of the Permanent Court of Justice had
earlier recognized the duty in the celebrated Lotus case, where, writing in dissent,
he stated, It is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent
the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its
people.103
During consultations regarding drafts of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, some States
expressed a tentative view that despite the notable lineage of the rule, it was of a
lex ferenda character.104 Indeed, when the issue of due diligence arose during U.N.
GGE deliberations regarding its 2013 and 2015 reports, all that could be agreed
98

For an argument that the Russian operations qualify as coercive intervention on the basis of the
nature of state interests, see Steven J. Barela, Zero Shades of Grey: Russian-Ops Violate International
Law, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/85QN-UUQC. The author finds Barelas
suggestion interesting, but unreflective of lex lata.

99

See generally Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J.F. 68 (2015).
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 6. For an excellent survey of the obligation of due
diligence, see INTL L. ASSN, STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIRST
REPORT (Mar. 7, 2014).
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101
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U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J., supra note 77.
Id. at 22; see also Neth. V. U.S., 2 R.I.A.A., supra note 64, at 839 (Territorial sovereignty . . . involves
the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This right has as corollary a duty: the obligation
to protect within the territory the rights of other States.).

103

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7) (separate opinion
by Moore, J.).

104

The author served as Director of the project and was present at all meetings.
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upon was a hortatory statement to the effect that States should take actions that
are necessary to put an end to harmful cyber operations occurring from their
territory.105
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts carefully considered this matter, particularly
since the principle had been applied principally in the context of transboundary
environmental harm.106 Although they agreed that the principle was a primary rule
of international law applicable in cyberspace, they framed a number of strict
limitations on its application. First, the due diligence obligation is one of conduct,
not result. Thus, so long as a State is taking all feasible measures to put an end to
the harmful cyber operations, it is in compliance with the obligation.107 Second, a
majority of the experts took the position that the obligation only requires a State
to take action in the face of ongoing harmful cyber activities, or ones in which a
material step has been taken towards execution.108 It imposes no preventative duty
to take measures to preclude future deleterious cyber activities from its territory
or to monitor its cyberspace for ongoing ones.109 Third, borrowing from
international environmental law, the experts agreed that the obligation only
attaches when the consequences for the victim State are serious.110 Relatedly,
they concluded the cyber activity in question must be contrary to the rights of
the target State in the sense that if it had been conducted by, or was attributable
to, another State, the operation would have qualified as an internationally
wrongful act.111
Despite these limitations, the principle of due diligence nevertheless acts to
relieve a target State of having to attribute election meddling to another State in
order to claim that it is the victim of an internationally wrongful act. So long as
the former can establish that the cyber operations would breach a legal obligation
had they been attributable to a State, for instance by violating sovereignty or
qualifying as a prohibited intervention, the State from whose territory the

105
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107
108
109
110

111

U.N. GGE 2013 Report, supra note 54, ¶ 23; U.N. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 54, ¶ 13(c).
See, for example, Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941); U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, prin. 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, prin. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 47.
Id. at 4344.
Id.
Id. at 34 (drawing from the Trail Smelter Case, supra note 106, at 1965); see also Intl Law Commn,
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
from Hazardous Activities, art. 2, ¶¶ 4, 6 of commentary, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2001] 2 Y.B. Intl L. Commn 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (using the
terms significant and substantial).
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 34.
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operations are being launched shoulders a legal duty to take feasible measures to
put an end to the operation. The cyber operations must have serious adverse
consequences, but interfering with another States national elections will usually
reach that threshold.
In the Russian meddling situation, it may be, as explained below, difficult to
attribute the action of non-State actors, especially the Internet Research Agency,
to Russia, a necessary step in finding Russia legally responsible for their actions.
However, so long as Russia was aware of the troll farms operations, it is
responsible for failing to put an end to these operations, at least to the extent they
would have violated international law had they been committed by organs of the
Russian State, such as its intelligence agencies. While it is hard to imagine that the
Russian authorities were unaware of the trolling, it is difficult to say with great
confidence that the operations were unlawful. Again, Russia identified and
exploited a grey zone of legal uncertainty.

D. Other Breaches of International Law
Some scholars have raised other possibilities for how Russian election
meddling may have breached international law. Particularly creative is Professor
Jens Ohlins assertion that it may have implicated self-determination, which grants
a people the right to determine their political arrangements (at a systemic level)
and their future destiny (at a more granular level of policy).112 Recognized in the
first article of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the right of self-determination is generally recognized as customary
international law.113 The identical articles provide that by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status.
However, as Ohlin himself notes, there are numerous reasons why
international lawyers might hesitate to take this position. They include the fact
that arguments based on self-determination typically appear when groups are
trying to create a State, perhaps through succession, and that the will of the
people cannot be determined with any degree of certainty before an election.114
But the best response against application is that self-determination is simply not
112

113

114

Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 1579, 1580 (2017).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 77, at ¶ 5; East Timor
(Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 28 (June 30) (finding self-determination to have an erga omnes
character).
Ohlin, supra note 112, at 159697.
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meant to apply to a situation where the people are all citizens of a State rather
than a distinct group therein that is denied the right to govern itself, as in the case
of colonialism, apartheid, alien subjugation, and perhaps occupation.
Somewhat more promising is Ohlins examination of the possibility that the
Russian operations may have violated the right to privacy under international
human rights law. The right to privacy is secured by Article 17 of the ICCPR,
which provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honor and reputation.115 Russia is also a party to the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 8(1) of which states that [e]veryone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.116 The right is generally considered to be customary in nature
and applicable to cyber correspondence, such as e-mail.117
Ohlin highlights a series of obstacles to a finding that the Russian operations
violated the human rights of affected individuals. He notes, for instance, that
human rights were originally conceived as applicable to a States own citizens and
points to the extensive practice of espionage that States have not characterized as
a violation of the right to privacy.118 The most significant obstacle, however, is the
open question of whether international human rights obligations are
extraterritorial in nature, an issue directly on point with respect to cyber operations
mounted remotely from outside a States territory. As Ohlin observes,119 there has
been significant disagreement within the U.S. government over the extraterritorial
applicability of the ICCPR.120
The broader question is the extraterritorial applicability of human rights
obligations generally, including customary law rights such as that requiring respect

115
116

117

118
119
120

ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 17.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1), Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 189. This conclusion is based in part on the fact that the
right is found in Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, (Dec. 10,
1948).
Ohlin, supra note 112, at 158485.
Id. at 158587.
In particular, the U.S. has long taken the position that the ICCPR obligations do not apply
extraterritorially. See, for example, U.N. Hum. Rts. Commn, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 469, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28,
2005). Interestingly, the State Departments Legal Adviser issued a 2010 memo to the effect this
position was incorrect as a matter of law. U.S. Dept of State, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, at 4 (Oct. 19, 2010). That memo did not mature into the U.S. position.
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for the right of privacy.121 Although the prevailing view is that treaty law (absent a
provision to the contrary) and customary human rights law apply extraterritorially,
such obligations attach only when the State exercises power or effective control
either over the foreign territory on which the individual owed the obligation is
located or over the individual concerned.122 Occupation of enemy territory
exemplifies the former, whereas detention of the individual abroad illustrates the
latter.
In the case of remote cyber operations, the State enjoys neither. An
argument nevertheless can be made that a State conducting a remote cyber
operation can sometimes control the exercise or enjoyment of a human right. 123
In the Russian cyber operations, for instance, remote non-consensual intrusion
into databases containing personal data and the subsequent release of that data
arguably deprived the individuals affected of the enjoyment of their right to
privacy. Although this is an appealing argument, it is thus far unsupported by
either State practice or expressions of opinio juris. The approach might amount to
laudable lex ferenda, but it is not lex lata.
Finally, any assertion that the activities underlying the election meddling
were unlawful under international law because they constituted espionage can be
quickly discarded. Cyber espionage is an act undertaken clandestinely or under
false pretenses that uses cyber capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather,
information, whether that information be private or governmental in nature.124
The GRUs cyber activities in the Russian case, such as the exfiltration of email
traffic, clearly constituted espionage. Similarly, collection operations targeting
U.S. primary campaigns, think tanks, and lobbying groups [that were] viewed as
likely to shape future U.S. policies qualify as espionage.125
Espionage, per se, does not violate of international law.126 Thus, the mere fact
that Russian intelligence agencies were conducting cyber espionage involving the
U.S. elections did not render them unlawful. That is not to say that an espionage
operation never violates international law, as the means by which the information
121

122

123
124

For comprehensive treatment of the subject, see MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY ch. IV (2011).
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 18384. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts drew the term
power or effective control from Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 2004). With regard to European Court of Human Rights
jurisprudence in this context, see Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, ¶¶ 130
39; Catan v. Moldova & Russia, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, ¶ 105.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 185.
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Id. at 168.
ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 32.
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is gathered may amount to an internationally wrongful act. For instance, if a
government aircraft flying in the national airspace of the target country conducts
cyber operations designed to access election-related cyber infrastructure, doing so
arguably violates the States sovereignty by virtue of the unconsented-to presence
of the aircraft.

IV. A TTRIBUTION
In a press statement made in the twilight of his presidency, President
Obama suggested that Russias data theft and subsequent disclosure were of a
nature that the highest levels of the Russian government must have ordered
them.127 The intelligence community likewise concluded that Putin ordered an
influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election.128 Specifically,
it found that the effort consisted of covert and overt activities by Russian
government agencies, State-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid
social media users or trolls.129
Predictably, Russia demanded that the U.S. provide the evidence to support
these allegations.130 Although the indictment brought by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller does contain an account of some alleged Russian activities, a granular U.S.
reply is unlikely, in great part because providing this evidence would reveal
sensitive cyber capabilities.131 Moreover, there is no obligation under international
law for one State accusing another State of unfriendlyor even unlawful
conduct to reveal the information on which it bases these accusations.132
Still, the U.S. governments naming of Russia as the actor behind the
influence campaign does raise the issue of the attribution. Recall that an act or
omission only qualifies as an internationally wrongful act if it both breaches an
obligation under international law and is attributable to a State. In this regard,
factual attribution must be distinguished from legal attribution. The former refers
to the level of certainty that a cyber operation was conducted by a particular
individual, group, organization, or State. As a general matter, factual attribution
127
128
129
130

131

132

Obama Press Release, supra note 1.
ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.
Id. at 2.
Putin Tells U.S. to Send Evidence of Vote Meddling, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/N2AYG56Y.
See, for example, David E. Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony
Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/WY9C-J45T (explaining U.S.
unwillingness to reveal the way it was able to attribute the 2014 Sony hack to North Korea).
This was the conclusion of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 IGE. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 83.
Although there is no legal obligation to do so, the U.N. GGE has encouraged States to provide
such evidence when cyber operations are at issue. U.N. GGE 2015 Report, supra note 54, at ¶ 15.

58

Vol. 19 No. 1

Virtual Disenfranchisement

Schmitt

under international law is subject to a reasonableness standard.133 With the notable
exception of attribution for the purpose of taking countermeasures, 134
international law generally does not require States to be correct in their
determinations; rather, they must be reasonable when making them.
Legal attribution, by contrast, deals with the conditions precedent to a
finding that a State is responsible for a cyber operation pursuant to the secondary
rules of international law set forth in the law of State responsibility. The
International Law Commission has authoritatively restated this body of law in its
Articles on State Responsibility.135 Legal attribution plays an essential role in
ascertaining the lawfulness of cyber meddling because a finding that cyber election
meddling constituted an internationally wrongful act requires both that the cyber
operations involved have breached an obligation owed by the meddling State (the
responsible State in the law of State responsibility) to the target State (the
injured State) and that the operations were attributable to the former as a legal
matter.
The most straightforward form of attribution is on the basis that an organ
of the State, like the GRU or other intelligence agency, conducted the cyber
operation in question.136 Such operations are attributable to the State even when
they are ultra vires, that is, beyond the assigned responsibility of the organ.137 As an
example, if the activities of the Russian intelligence agencies with respect to the
U.S. elections were unauthorized, Russia would nevertheless bear responsibility
under international law. The key is whether the organ is acting in an apparently
official capacity or a purely private one.138 Engaging in private criminal activity for
personal gain would be an example of the latter.
To qualify as an organ of the State, the entity must either enjoy that status
under the States domestic laws or factually act as an instrument of, and in

133

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 8182. Fact-finding bodies like tribunals, arbitral panels,
domestic courts and the like must abide by the standards and burdens of proof applicable in
proceedings before them. These may differ, as in the case of criminal trials imposing a higher
standard of proof than applicable in civil proceedings.
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Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, ¶ 3 of commentary to art. 49; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at 116. A State that
misattributes a cyber operation upon which a countermeasure is based commits an internationally
wrongful act.
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Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8.
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Id., art. 4(1); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 15.
And even in the face of contrary direction from superiors. See Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8, at ¶ 13 of commentary to
art. 4.
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complete dependence on, the State.139 The inclusion of de facto organs precludes a
State from escaping responsibility for a breach of its international obligations by
simply failing to designate as such an entity that is acting as an organ of the State.
For instance, by setting up an extra-legal cyber intelligence organization that
operates entirely for State purposes and at its direction, a State does not evade
legal responsibility for its operations.140
By these standards, Russia is responsible for any aspect of the cyber election
meddling conducted by its intelligence agencies that amounted to a violation of
an international law prohibition, as arguably was the case vis-à-vis the hacking and
release operation. However, the activities of State-owned entities present a more
complicated situation. The fact that an entity is State-owned does not suffice in
itself for attribution of its activities to the State.141 Rather, it must be determined
whether the entity, despite being owned by the State, engages in undertakings that
are solely private in nature, such as commerce. If so, its actions are not attributable
to the State simply on the basis that it is an organ of the State.
Particularly problematic is the case of State-owned media, for the media
sometimes serve governmental purposes like conveying government information
to the public or serving as a surrogate of the State internationally in public
diplomacy, propaganda, or disinformation activities. Yet, State-owned media may
also, despite government ownership, act independently, much like a private media
company. In terms of attribution, the key is whether the State was using its
ownership interest in or control of a corporation specifically in order to achieve a
particular result.142 According to the ODNI Report, this was the case with respect
to RT and Sputnik because they contributed to the digital part of the influence
campaign.143 However, even if the actions of these and other Russian media might
139

140

141

142

143

Id. at ¶ 11 of commentary to art. 4; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶¶ 39293 (Feb. 26).
Person or entities that do not qualify as de jure or de facto State organs may nevertheless be
empowered under domestic law to exercise elements of governmental authority. If so, their
activities, including those that are ultra vires, are attributable to the State. Intl Law Commn, Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 8, art. 5; TALLINN
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 15. Because of the requirement for authorization under law and
the limitation to activities that are by nature elements of government authority, attribution on this
basis is unlikely in the case of cyber election meddling. A possible exception would be a secret
contract to engage in offensive cyber operations during foreign elections.
Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, at ¶ 6 of commentary to art. 8.
Id. at ¶ 6 of commentary to art. 8 (citing Foremost Tehran, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 228 (1986); American Bell International Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 170 (1986)).
ODNI REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
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be attributable to the State, it is difficult to style their activities as a breach of any
obligation Russia owed the U.S.
As illustrated in the case of U.S. election meddling, the relevant cyber
operations may be conducted by actors other than organs of the State, as with the
Internet Research Agencys troll farm. Because the nexus to the State is more
attenuated in these situations, the threshold for attribution is more demanding
than that applicable to organs of the State. For instance, the State is not
responsible for ultra vires activities of the non-State actors like private companies,
patriotic hacker groups, or hacktivists.144
The key normative hurdle to attribution, however, is that the State is only
responsible for the cyber operations of a non-State actor when the actions taken
are pursuant to the instructions of, or under the direction or control of the
State,145 or when the State acknowledges and adopts the operations as its own post
factum.146 The likelihood that a State might acknowledge and adopt a non-State
actors cyber meddling in another States elections is slim. Therefore, the crux of
the matter is the meaning of the terms instructions, direction, and control.
Both the International Law Commission and legal scholars have struggled to
describe the difference between the three terms with meaningful granularity.147
Their failure has signaled a definitional grey zone no less dense than those
described earlier in the context of breaches of obligations, and no less susceptible
to leveraging by a State wishing to meddle in foreign elections.
The International Law Commissions commentary to the Articles on State
Responsibility suggests that instruction denotes a situation in which the nonState actor functions as the States auxiliary.148 Restated, a State instructs a nonState actor when it directs the non-State actor to perform a particular cyber
operation, including election meddling, on its behalf. There is no requirement that
144
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Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, at ¶¶ 78 of commentary to art. 8.
Id. at art. 8; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, at r. 17(a).
Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, art. 11; TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 53, r. 17(b). Acknowledgment and adoption
were illustrated in the actions of the Iranian government following the 1979 occupation of the US
Embassy and consulates in Iran and the decision of the Ayatollah Khomeini to perpetuate those
activities, including keeping US personnel hostage therein. The International Court of Justice later
found Iran responsible on this basis. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (May 24).
Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, ¶¶ 25 of commentary to art. 8; see also Kubo Ma ák, Decoding Article 8 of the International
Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility: Attribution of Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors, 21 J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 405 (2016).
Intl Law Commn, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 8, at ¶ 2 of commentary to art. 8.
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the non-State actor be compensated for the activity involved, although the
possibility is not excluded. For instance, a hacker group could execute a cyber
operation on the instructions of a State intelligence agency solely out of patriotism.
Likewise, a criminal organization could carry out the same operation solely for
financial gain. So long as the State told the group to conduct it, motivation is
irrelevant.
Although the International Law Commissions commentary suggests that
the terms direction and control are to be understood in the disjunctive,149 it
goes on to treat them ensemble as effective control,150 a standard articulated by
the ICJ in Nicaragua151 and subsequently confirmed in its Genocide judgment.152 In
the latter case, the Court explained:
[I]t is not necessary to show that the persons who performed the acts alleged
to have violated international law were in general in a relationship of
complete dependence on the respondent State; it has to be proved that they
acted in accordance with that States instructions or under its effective
control. It must however be shown that this effective control was
exercised, or that the States instructions were given, in respect of each
operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of
the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having
committed the violations.153

Perhaps the best way to think of effective control in the context of
attribution for cyber election meddling is a de facto ability on the part of the State
to cause the non-State group in question to launch a cyber operation that it would
otherwise not launch or to refrain from one in which it desires to engage. It need
not instruct the group to engage in a particular operation, but the relationship
between the State and the group must be such that the State can, if it wishes,
compel the non-State group to desist in the operation or alter the conduct thereof.
Unfortunately, the effective control test raises as many questions as it
answers. For instance, with what degree of granularity must the State be aware of
the operation in question to exercise effective control over it? And by what means
may effective control be established? If a State provides all of the funding that
makes the groups cyber operations possible, but the group develops its own
operational design, is sufficient control in place to attribute the groups cyber
activities to the State?
By outsourcing aspects of its interference campaign to private entities and
individuals, Russia again found a grey zone of international law that allowed it safe
haven to carry out its activities, for it is much more difficult to ascertain legal
149
150
151

Id. at ¶ 7 of commentary to art. 8.
Id. at ¶¶ 45 of commentary to art. 8.
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Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J., supra note 77, at ¶ 115.
Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 2007 I.C.J., supra note 139, at ¶ 400.

153

Id.
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attribution in such cases than in those situations involving the States organs. The
U.S. intelligence community may have felt comfortable in attributing the
operations of the Intelligence Research Agency and other non-State actors to
Russia, but in doing so it was not applying the strict legal tests set forth in the law
of State responsibility. Indeed, based on the information contained in their 2017
report and other open source material, it is difficult to conclusively attribute these
actions to Russia as a matter of law, although it would seem self-evident that those
actions were carried out as a matter of fact in support of Russian governmental
objectives. The best that can be said is that it might be reasonable to attribute
them to Russia.

V. R ESPONSES
Responding to the Russian cyber operations, and as the Trump inauguration
loomed, the Obama Administration imposed sanctions on the GRU and Federal
Security Service (FSB), four GRU intelligence officers, and three companies that
had supported the GRUs operations. The Secretary of the Treasury designated
two Russians as having used cyber-enabled means to cause misappropriation of
funds and personal identifying information, while the Department of State
shuttered two Russian compounds used for intelligence purposes and declared
thirty-five Russian intelligence operatives persona non grata.154
In March 2018, the Trump Administration finally announced sanctions on
Russia after much foot-dragging following the passage of sanctions legislation in
July 2017.155 This was the first time that the administration had officially
acknowledged Russias involvement in the operations. Of particular note were
sanctions on the Internet Research Agency, as well as Russians indicted by Special
Counsel Robert Mueller. The FSB and GRU were also sanctioned.156 Further
sanctions, also tied to the legislation, were announced the following month.157
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Under international law, there are four categories of responses available to
States facing hostile cyber operations.158 The measures taken by the Obama and
Trump Administrations fall into the category of retorsion. An act of retorsion
is an unfriendly, but not otherwise unlawful measure,159 with sanctions and
expulsion of diplomatic personnel being the most emblematic and frequent.160 The
cyber operations to which an act of retorsion responds need not constitute an
internationally wrongful act, although they may. That both administrations limited
their responses to retorsion suggests that they were hesitant to characterize the
Russian operations as breaches of international law attributable to Russia. If this
was the case, the Russian tactic of operating within the grey zone proved partially
successful.
If the cyber operation to which the target State wishes to respond qualifies
as an internationally wrongful act, countermeasures may be taken.
Countermeasures are measures that would be unlawful, either as a breach of treaty
law or of customary international law, but for the fact that they are a response to
another States internationally wrongful act.161 They must be proportionate to the
internationally wrongful act, and, within the cyber context, be designed to cause
the other State to desist in its ongoing unlawful cyber operations or to provide
assurances, guarantees, or reparations.162 The classic example is an active defense
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cyber operation, typically a hack back designed to end a malicious cyber
operation launched by another State.163
Although there are numerous other limitations on the taking of
countermeasures, the option allows for flexibility in two regards. First,
countermeasures need not be directed at the entity that launched the initial
unlawful cyber operation.164 As an example, unlawful cyber election meddling
could be addressed by conducting hack backs against government ministries, or
even private cyber infrastructure, so long as the purpose of doing so is to apply
pressure to end the meddling; retaliation or punishment are not permissible
purposes. Second, countermeasures need not be in kind.165 Thus, cyber election
meddling could be addressed by engaging in non-cyber measures that would
otherwise be unlawful, such as imposing trade sanctions that are contrary to a
treaty between the two States.166
A third response is based upon the plea of necessity. States may engage in
cyber or non-cyber activities that would otherwise be unlawful when their
essential interests face grave and imminent peril and taking the responsive
measures is the only way to defend the interest.167 In such cases, there is no
requirement that the situation to which the response is taken either constitutes a
breach of a legal obligation or be attributable to a State. This dispenses with much
of the grey zone discussed earlier. In the Russian case, for example, the U.S. would
not have needed to conclude that the influence campaign violated any primary
rule of international law or establish that the nexus between the Russian
government and those conducting the operations satisfies the attribution tests set
out in the law of State responsibility.
However, those grey zone issues are replaced by others resident in the plea
of necessity. The determinative issue is whether the integrity of the election system
amounts to an essential interest of the State. Although it is reasonable to hold that
the fair and credible election of high-level government officials, especially the
President, is an essential interest of the State, whereas the election of local officials
might not be, the threshold of essentiality is indistinct. Moreover, the situation
must be ongoing or imminent and the threat posed must be extremely serious.
Minor cyber election meddling, even in national elections, would not merit a
163
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response based on the plea, while meddling that threatened the outcome of an
election might be characterized as grave. Determining when the peril posed by
cyber election meddling in other cases qualifies as grave is more challenging.
The final response option is the use of cyber or non-cyber force in selfdefense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international
law. The textual condition precedent for self-defense is an armed attack.168
Unfortunately, the threshold at which a cyber operation qualifies as an armed
attack is unsettled.169 Certainly, a cyber operation that causes significant physical
damage or injury suffices, although consequences at this level are highly unlikely
with respect to cyber election meddling. Whether nondestructive or injurious
consequences that are severe would merit the use of force in self-defense is highly
questionable. In the authors opinion, it is difficult to envision even internationally
unlawful cyber election meddling that would, without more, allow the target State
to resort to force in order to put an end to the operations.

VI. R EFLECTIONS ON G REY A REAS
Cyber election meddling presently exists within the grey zone of
international law. This zone of normative uncertainty presents a tempting
environment for States that are not fully committed to the international rule of
law. By operating within the grey zone, these States can avoid consensus
condemnation of their cyber operations as violations of binding international legal
norms. Moreover, absent a clear violation of international law attributable to the
State launching the operationsand as the U.S. responses to date have
demonstratedvictim State responses will generally be limited to acts of
retorsion.
As the international community struggles to identify how extant norms such
as respect for sovereignty, the prohibition of intervention, and due diligence
obligations apply to cyber operations, some of those involved in cyber law and
policy are attempting to limit the reach of international law into cyberspace. For
instance, the recent failure of the U.N. GGE to agree upon text for its aborted
2017 report concerning such basic matters as applicability of the law of selfdefense and international humanitarian law, topics that they had addressed in
previous reports, marks a major step backwards.170 That opposition to the text
included Russia and China does not bode well for global cyber security or the rule
of law more generally. Clearly, certain States are embracing legal ambiguity as a
force multiplier in their cyber operations. In the realm of cyber election meddling,
168
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the ambiguity stretches from an existential threat to sovereignty as a primary rule
of law to confusion over the application of the coercion criterion to voting
behavior. This ambiguity represents a troubling threat to the democratic process.
Some States are taking the lead in attempting to shrink the grey zone. Efforts
to bring like-minded States together to craft consensus are laudable. So too are
cyber law capacity-building efforts such as the Netherlands Hague Process, in
which the Netherlands sponsors regional training in collaboration with other
States to construct common ground for future negotiations over the content,
shape, and vector of international cyber law.171
Ultimately, States need to make a choice. The grey zone represents both
opportunity and threat. Until States exercise their prerogative to develop new
norms and interpret existing ones in the context of cyber operations, those States
that are not committed to a rule-based international order will enjoy an
asymmetrical advantage over those that are dedicated to compliance with the law.
And foreign elections will continue to represent a lucrative target in the strategies
of the former.
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